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I. INTRODUCTION 
In State v. Riggs, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided 
whether a trial court may reduce a crime victim’s restitution award 
when the victim was the initial aggressor. The restitution statute, 
Minnesota Statutes section 611A.045, provides criteria that trial 
courts must apply when awarding restitution; however, the victim’s 
fault is not listed among the criteria.1 In Riggs, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court held that Minnesota Statutes section 611A.045 
establishes exclusive criteria that prohibits trial courts from 
considering any non-specified factors;2 as such, it prohibited 
consideration of the victim’s fault in determining a restitution 
award.3 
This Note first reviews the history of criminal restitution and 
provides a background for understanding Minnesota’s restitution 
law.4 It then discusses the facts of Riggs and examines the parties’ 
arguments and the court’s rationale for its decision.5 Next, it 
analyzes the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in the context of 
Minnesota’s case law on restitution and the court’s role in 
interpreting statutes.6 This Note suggests that the legislature, not 
the court, must weigh the policy choices in deciding whether 
Minnesota’s restitution law should incorporate the victim’s 
comparative fault, and it concludes that the court correctly 
interpreted the restitution statute and correctly declined to 
recognize comparative fault as an aspect of restitution 
determinations.7 
1.  See State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 686 (Minn. 2015).
2.  Id. at 685–86.
3.  Id.
4.  See infra Part II.
5.  See infra Part III.
6.  See infra Part IV.
7.  See infra Part V.
2
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II. A HISTORY OF CRIMINAL RESTITUTION
A. Generally 
Criminal restitution is a court order directing an offender to 
financially compensate his victim for the expenses and losses 
incurred by the victim as a result of the offender’s crime.8 
Restitution typically does not compensate a victim for mental pain 
and suffering, as might a civil remedy; rather, it only compensates 
for tangible losses.9 Thus, the purpose of restitution is 
compensatory: to make the criminal victim whole again. Yet, 
restitution may also serve a punitive purpose.10 Restitution is part of 
the criminal justice system;11 it is integrated with criminal 
sentencing12 and is commonly ordered at the time of sentencing.13 
Restitution incorporates features of civil law, but it is distinct from 
civil liability.14 Unlike a civil remedy, a restitution order acts as a 
condition of a criminal sentence between the state and the 
offender and not merely as a settlement or judgment between 
private individuals.15 However, the imposition of a restitution order 
does not necessarily preclude the victim from pursuing additional 
civil remedies arising from the same incident.16 
B. Early History 
Criminal restitution is an ancient legal concept.17 Historians 
trace its emergence to the development of the earliest structured 
societies and legal codes.18 For example, restitution was prescribed 
8.  See Note, Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97
HARV. L. REV. 931, 932 (1984). 
9.  See 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.6(c) (4th ed.
2016).  
10.  See 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 2474 (2016).
11.  See id. § 2479.
12.  See Kimberly J. Winbush, Annotation, Persons or Entities Entitled to
Restitution as “Victim” Under State Criminal Restitution Statute, 92 A.L.R. 5th 35 § 2[a] 
(2001); 6 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 9. 
13.  See 9 HENRY W. MCCARR ET AL., MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES: CRIMINAL LAW 
AND PROCEDURE § 36:15 (4th ed. 2015). 
14.  See Winbush, supra note 12.
15.  See 24 C.J.S., supra note 10, § 2479.
16.  See id.
17.  See Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process, supra note 8, at 933.
18.  See Richard E. Laster, Criminal Restitution: A Survey of Its Past History, in
3
Anderson: Criminal Law: The System is Rigged: Criminal Restitution Is Blind
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2017
  
2017] STATE V. RIGGS 143 
in such codes as the Torah, the Code of Hammurabi (ca. 1700 BC), 
the Code of Lipit-Ishtar (ca. 1875 BC), the Summerian Code of Ur-
Nammu (ca. 2050 BC), and the Code of Eshnunna (ca. 1700 BC).19 
Restitution was also a feature of the Roman Law of the Twelve 
Tribes (ca. 449 BC); the Germanic tribal laws, Lex Salica (ca. AD 
496); and early Anglo-Saxon laws in England (ca. AD 600).20 Within 
these codes, restitution encompassed both proportional physical 
retribution (e.g., “eye for eye”) and financial compensation to the 
victim for his losses.21 
In ancient times, restitution served the joint purposes of 
safeguarding the community and ensuring justice for the victim.22 
Prior to early legal codes, the victims of crime and the victims’ 
family members often sought private retribution against criminals 
through violence and retaliation.23 Restitution offered a structured 
substitute for such self-help measures and provided an authoritative 
means to reconcile offender and victim.24 Criminal restitution thus 
“protect[ed] the offender from violent retaliation by the victim or 
the community”25 and served to maintain and restore community 
peace and order.26 Furthermore, an overarching feature of early 
CONSIDERING THE VICTIM 19, 19–21 (Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson eds., 1975). 
19. Daniel W. Van Ness, Restorative Justice, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE, RESTITUTION, 
AND RECONCILIATION 7, 7 (Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson eds., 1990); see Laster, supra 
note 18, at 20–21; see, e.g., Numbers 5:6–7 (New King James) (“When a man or 
woman commits any sin that men commit in unfaithfulness against the Lord, and 
that person is guilty, then he shall confess the sin which he has committed. He 
shall make restitution for his trespass in full, plus one-fifth of it, and give it to the 
one he has wronged.”). 
20. Van Ness, supra note 19, at 7.
21.  See PEGGY M. TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 4
(2d ed. 2010) (comparing Exodus 21:23–25, “life for life, eye for eye, tooth for 
tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, stripe for 
stripe,” with Exodus 21:18–19, requiring the offender to “pay for the loss of his 
[victim’s] time [during his recovery] and [to] have him thoroughly healed”). 
22.  Commentators vary in their assessments of the primary purpose of
restitution. Compare Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process, supra note 8, at 933 
(“The primary purpose of such restitution was not to compensate the victim, but 
to protect the offender from violent retaliation by the victim or the community.”), 
with Laster, supra note 18, at 24 (“[T]he aim of [restitution] . . . was primarily to 
make the victim whole and secondarily to minimize private revenge.”). 
23.  See Laster, supra note 18, at 19–20.
24.  See Van Ness, supra note 19, at 8–9.
25.  See Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process, supra note 8, at 933.
26.  See Van Ness, supra note 19, at 8–9; see also Laster, supra note 18, at 21–22
(“[T]hese codes encouraged settlement or composition between the parties for 
4
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restitution was its recognition of the victim’s right to receive just 
compensation for injury.27 In this way, restitution also codified the 
victim’s right to be made whole.28 
In its earliest forms, restitution was centered on the victim.29 
This stands in contrast to the state-centered notion of criminal 
justice that arose during the Middle Ages.30 Prior to the Middle 
Ages, beyond a short list of public “criminal” offenses, such as 
witchcraft, bestiality, and incest,31 there was not yet a distinction 
between civil law and criminal law.32 Most offenses against 
individuals were resolved through prescribed restitutive measures 
with the central focus on the victim and the victim’s family.33 
In the eleventh century, as political power consolidated under 
the crown of England and the reach of government expanded, laws 
were enacted that changed a number of offenses from crimes 
against individuals into crimes “against the king’s peace.”34 These 
laws ushered in a new legal era in which the king and the state 
eventually supplanted the victim as the aggrieved party of particular 
crimes.35 
In this new era, criminals were ordered to pay fines directly to 
the government rather than make restitution to their victims.36 
Because violent offenses were seen as breaches of the king’s peace, 
it was thought that the state was entitled to share in a victim’s 
harmful acts as serious as homicide, personal injury less than homicide, rape, 
adultery, and theft . . . . There are benefits . . . in reduction of tension, benefits to 
the victim in monetary satisfaction, and benefits to the criminal in retrieving his 
lost security.”). 
27.  See Van Ness, supra note 19, at 7 (“What we see in ancient cultures is a
recognition that it was the victim who was injured by crime, and therefore it was 
the victim who had the right to be compensated.”). 
28.  See TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 4.
29.  See id. at 4–5.
30.  See id. at 5; Van Ness, supra note 19, at 7.
31.  See TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 5.
32.  See Laster, supra note 18, at 24.
33.  See TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 5; Van Ness, supra note 19, at 8.
34.  See WILLIAMSON M. EVERS, THE INDEPENDENT INSTITUTE, VICTIMS’ RIGHTS, 
RESTITUTION, AND RETRIBUTION 7 (1996); TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 5; 
Van Ness, supra note 19, at 8. But see Patrick D. McAnany, Restitution as Idea and 
Practice: The Retributive Process, in OFFENDER RESTITUTION IN THEORY AND ACTION 15, 
16 (Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson eds., 1977) (placing the emergence of crimes 
against the “king’s peace” in the 16th century). 
35.  See Van Ness, supra note 19, at 7–8.
36.  See TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 5.
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compensation.37 This change marked the point at which the law 
began to diverge into separate criminal and civil branches;38 and 
accordingly, “the victim’s right to compensation was [eventually] 
incorporated into civil law.”39 As a result, the central standing of the 
victim, and his right to be made whole through the criminal 
process, was significantly diminished.40 Restitution thus became a 
private civil right of action, untethered from its original restorative 
purpose.41 Detached from a victim-centered approach, criminal 
justice evolved to serve state-centric punitive goals: deterrence, 
incarceration, and rehabilitation of the offender.42 
America’s criminal justice history mirrors this shift from a 
victim-centered approach to a state-centered prosecution and 
punishment of criminals.43 Prior to the American Revolution, the 
investigation, apprehension, and prosecution of criminals was 
largely accomplished through the efforts of private individuals with 
the assistance of privately-funded investigators, bounty hunters, and 
constables.44 The upshot of this privatized system was that upon 
successful prosecution of the offender, the victim could expect to 
obtain monetary damages from the offender or to obtain the 
offender’s servitude until the offender satisfied the full value of the 
damages.45 
By the start of the American Revolution, the private system of 
criminal justice had given way to one of public administration.46 
The American government established professional police patrols 
37.  See Laster, supra note 18, at 28.
38.  See id. at 23–24; TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 5; Victim Restitution
in the Criminal Process, supra note 8, at 933–34.  
39.  Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process, supra note 8, at 933–34; see also
TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 5. 
40.  See TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 5; Laster, supra note 18, at 28.
41.  See TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 5; Laster, supra note 18, at 24–25, 
28 (“This shift in focus may have resulted in monetary benefits for the king, but it 
reduced the economic lot of the victim, shifted the aim of the law away from any 
constructive policy of restitution, and reinforced the concept of harm to society to 
justify the criminalization of certain ‘harmful’ acts to individuals.”); Van Ness, 
supra note 19, at 8. 
42.  See Laster, supra note 18, at 25; Van Ness, supra note 19, at 8.
43.  See TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 5–6.
44.  See EVERS, supra note 34, at 15–16; TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21,
at  5–6.  
45.  See EVERS, supra note 34, at 15–16; TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21,
at  5–6. 
46.  See EVERS, supra note 34, at 16; TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 6.
6
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charged with investigating and apprehending criminals.47 The 
government also assumed total responsibility for initiating and 
prosecuting criminal cases.48 Criminal sanctions that had at one 
time directed restitution to crime victims were replaced by 
imprisonment and fines paid to the government.49 Over time, the 
crime victim’s role was diminished to that of a witness to the 
government’s prosecution of the case, without regard for personal 
compensation for their losses.50 By the mid-nineteenth century, the 
transfer of restitution into the civil law system was complete.51 
C. The Victims’ Rights Movement and the Re-emergence of Criminal 
Restitution 
The re-emergence of restitution within the criminal justice 
system began with a renewal of public interest concerns for victims 
of crime.52 Historians have traced the origin of this renewed 
interest to academic works from the 1940s and 1950s about 
“victimology”: the study of the relationship between victims and 
offenders.53 As the study of victimology developed, researchers 
began to identify changes to the criminal justice system that could 
address the perceived exclusion of crime victims in the system.54 
Among the changes the researchers proposed were restoring 
restitution to crime victims and increasing the role of the victim 
during the criminal justice process.55 
In the 1960s, victimology began to influence public policy. For 
example, momentum from the renewed interest in crime victims 
influenced the recommendations of President Lyndon Johnson’s 
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 
which his administration established to study criminal justice and 
make recommendations for systemic changes in response to rising 
crime rates in the 1960s.56 The commission published a report in 
1967 that recommended proposals to increase victim involvement 
47.  See TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 6.
48.  See EVERS, supra note 34, at 16; TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 6.
49.  See EVERS, supra note 34, at 16; TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 6.
50.  See TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 6.
51.  See id. at 6, 153.
52.  Id. at 6.
53.  Id.
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in the criminal process, address crime victims’ financial losses, and 
establish supplemental government-based systems of victim 
compensation.57 Although distinct from restitution, 
implementation of the first state-sponsored crime-victim-
compensation programs in the 1960s marked a significant step in 
reorienting the criminal justice system toward the victim.58 
During the 1970s and 1980s, support for victims of crime 
developed into a full-fledged victims’ rights movement in 
America.59 In response, victim-compensation and victim-assistance 
programs were established in a majority of states.60 At the national 
level, in 1981, President Ronald Reagan recognized the movement 
by establishing the first National Crime Victims’ Rights Week.61 
Then, in 1982, President Reagan created the President’s Task 
Force on Victims of Crime, which was charged with studying 
criminal victimization and receiving input from victims.62 
Released in December 1982, the Final Report of the Reagan 
Administration’s Task Force on Victims of Crime recommended 
new federal and state legislation to establish restitution in all 
criminal cases where the victim sustained financial losses.63 In 1983, 
the American Bar Association endorsed the Task Force’s 
recommendation, adding that crime victims should expect 
sentencing judges “to give ‘priority consideration’ to restitution as a 
condition of [the offender’s] probation.”64 Additionally, in 1982, 
Congress enacted the federal Victim and Witness Protection Act 
(VWPA), which mandated restitution to victims of certain federal 
crimes.65 Congress updated the VWPA in 1996 with the Mandatory 
Victims Restitution Act (MVRA).66 
57.  Id.
58.  See id. at 7–8.
59.  Id. at 8–10.
60.  Id.  at 9.
61.  Id.  at 10.
62.  See id. at 7–8.
63.  EVERS, supra note 34, at 24; TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 10.
64.  EVERS, supra note 34, at 24–25.
65.  See Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96
Stat. 1248. 
66. Bridgett N. Shephard, Classifying Crime Victim Restitution: The Theoretical
Arguments and Practical Consequences of Labeling Restitution as Either a Criminal or Civil 
Law Concept, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 801, 806 (2014) (citing Mandatory Victims 
Restitution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1227). 
8
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Prior to the release of the Final Report, only eight states had 
mandated victim restitution during criminal sentencing.67 However, 
after issuance of the report, many states decided to enact or update 
their criminal restitution statutes.68 By 1995, twenty-nine states had 
adopted mandatory or presumptive restitution.69 Today, every state 
has enacted criminal restitution statutes to compensate victims of 
crime.70 
D. Criminal Restitution in Minnesota 
When Minnesota first enacted its criminal restitution statute in 
1983, it prescribed very little.71 Crime victims were to request 
restitution by providing the court itemized losses and reasons 
justifying the amount requested.72 The court, in turn, merely had to 
make a record of its reasons for granting or denying the requested 
restitution.73 The statute neither mandated nor restricted the 
court’s consideration to specific restitution criteria.74 
Over the next several years, Minnesota’s legislature established 
additional procedural components for determining restitution that 
controlled courts’ discretion. In 1985, the legislature enacted 
section 611A.045, which, in part, mandated that district courts must 
consider the “economic loss sustained by the victim as a result of 
the offense” when calculating the award.75 Additionally, section 
611A.045 established the evidentiary standard, preponderance of 
the evidence, and placed the burden of proof on the prosecution.76 
Then, in 1989, the legislature added a second criterion for 
restitution determinations: it mandated that district courts also 
consider the “income, resources, and obligations of the 
67.  See TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 153.
68.  EVERS, supra note 34, at 25; TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 154.
69.  TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 154.
70.  See 6 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 9.
71.  Compare Act of June 6, 1983, ch. 262, § 4, 1983 Minn. Laws 1125, 1127
(codified at MINN. STAT. § 611A.04 (1984)), with Act of June 2, 1977, ch. 355, § 6, 
1977 Minn. Laws 765, 766 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 609.135 (2016)) (authorizing 
restitution as a permissible sentence when a district court stays imposition or 
execution of a felony sentence). 
72.  § 4, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1127. 
73.  See id.
74.  See id.
75.  Act of May 10, 1985, ch. 110, § 2, 1985 Minn. Laws 305, 306 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 611A.045 (1985)). 
76.  Id.
9
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defendant.”77 The 1989 amendment further clarified the scope of 
the victim’s compensable losses: restitution could be awarded for, 
but was not limited to, the victim’s out-of-pocket losses, medical 
and therapy costs, replacement wages and services, costs of 
returning a victim child, and funeral expenses.78 
In its current form, Minnesota’s restitution statute provides 
two criteria for the trial court’s restitution determination. First, the 
trial court must consider “the amount of economic loss sustained 
by the victim as a result of the offense.”79 Second, the trial court 
must consider “the income, resources, and obligations of the 
defendant.”80 No other criteria or factors are listed. 
III. THE RIGGS DECISION
A. Facts and Procedure 
On May 4, 2012, the eventual victim, D.S., confronted Brandon 
Riggs at a Kwik Trip gas station in Minnesota City, Minnesota, over 
the quality of the marijuana that Riggs had previously sold to D.S.81 
Riggs responded by leaving the gas station, and D.S. followed him.82 
After Riggs arrived at Cone Chiropractic in Winona, Minnesota, 
D.S. followed Riggs into the office entryway and attacked Riggs by 
punching him in the head.83 During the ensuing fight, Riggs 
stabbed D.S. with a knife in the leg and stomach.84 
The State of Minnesota charged Riggs with second-degree 
assault and terroristic threats.85 Riggs initially claimed self-defense.86 
Following a plea agreement, Riggs pled guilty to making terroristic 
77. Act of Apr. 4, 1989, ch. 21, § 7, 1989 Minn. Laws 38, 42 (codified at MINN. 
STAT. § 611A.045 (1989)). 
78.  Id. § 4, 1989 Minn. Laws at 42 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 611A.04 (1989)).
79.  MINN. STAT. § 611A.045, subdiv. 1(a) (2016).
80.  Id.
81. State v. Riggs, No. 85-CR-12-960, 2013 WL 9348661, at *1 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
June 7, 2013), rev’d, 845 N.W.2d 236 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014), aff’d, 865 N.W.2d 679 
(Minn. 2015). 
82.  Id.
83.  Riggs, 845 N.W.2d at 237.
84.  Id.
85.  Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 681.
86. Defendant’s Restitution Memorandum at 1, State v. Riggs, No. 85-CR-12-
960 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 7, 2013), 2013 WL 8981222. 
10
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threats, and the State dismissed the assault charge.87 At the plea 
hearing, Riggs formally waived his right to claim self-defense.88 
D.S. filed a victim’s restitution request, and the State sought 
$2,973.07 from Riggs for restitution covering D.S.’s employment-
related expenses incurred as a result of D.S.’s injuries from the 
stabbing.89 Riggs asked the district court to reduce the requested 
restitution award by half because D.S. was the initial aggressor in 
the fight.90 The State argued that the restitution statute, section 
611A.045, provided exclusive criteria for determining the amount 
of restitution and therefore prohibited consideration of the 
victim’s fault in calculating the amount of restitution because it was 
not an explicit factor in the statute.91 The relevant portion of 
section 611A.045 states: 
The court, in determining whether to order restitution 
and the amount of the restitution, shall consider the 
following factors: 
(1) the amount of economic loss sustained by the 
victim as a result of the  offense; and 
(2) the income, resources, and obligations of the 
defendant.92 
Over the State’s objection, the district court concluded that it could 
exercise discretion to reduce the amount of the restitution “by 
apportioning some of the fault for the victim’s injuries to the victim 
if the victim was the aggressor in the conflict.”93 The district court 
ordered Riggs to pay half of D.S.’s employment-related restitution 
expenses.94 
The court of appeals reversed the district court’s restitution 
award on statutory interpretation grounds, concluding that the 
district court impermissibly considered the victim’s fault in 
reaching its restitution award. The court of appeals construed 
section 611A.045, subdivision 1(a), to mandate consideration of 
only the explicit factors and not any other factor, including whether 
87.  Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 681.
88.  Riggs, 845 N.W.2d at 237.
89.  Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 681.
90.  Id.
91.  Id. at 681–82.
92.  MINN. STAT. § 611A.045, subdiv. 1(a) (2016).
93.  Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 682.
94.  Id.
11
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the victim was the aggressor.95 The Minnesota Supreme Court 
granted Riggs’s petition for review.96 
B. The Minnesota Supreme Court Decision and Rationale 
Riggs and the State argued for different interpretations of the 
restitution statute before the Minnesota Supreme Court. First, 
Riggs contended that the plain language of section 611A.045 “[did] 
not limit what a court can consider [when determining restitution]; 
it merely specifie[d] the factors that a court must consider.”97 
According to Riggs, had the legislature intended to limit 
consideration to the specified factors, the statute would have read 
“shall only consider.”98 Under Riggs’s approach, the trial court 
could consider the victim’s fault whenever it was relevant to the 
restitution award. The State countered that the entirety of the 
restitution statute demonstrated that the legislature used such 
inclusive language as “may include, but is not limited to” to 
indicate its intent for consideration of non-explicit factors.99 
According to the State, because section 611A.045 did not contain 
such language, trial courts must not consider any factor beyond 
those that are listed.100 
Addressing Riggs’s first argument, the majority concluded that 
the plain language of section 611A.045, subdivision 1, establishes 
exclusive criteria and prohibited consideration of any additional 
factors.101 The majority supported its conclusion by reviewing the 
95. State v. Riggs, 845 N.W.2d 236, 238–39 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014), aff’d, 865
N.W.2d 679 (explaining that the omission of a phrase from a statute is presumed 
to be deliberate and therefore the legislature intentionally eliminated from 
consideration any factors other than those enumerated to determine the 
restitution amount). 
96.  Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 682.
97. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 4, State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679 (Minn. 2015)
(No. A13-1189). 
98.  Appellant’s Brief and Addendum, State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679 (Minn.
2015) (No. A13-1189), 2014 WL 4547916, at *11. 
99. Respondent’s Brief, State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679 (Minn. 2015) (No.
A13-1189), 2014 WL 5099417, at *9 (“Minnesota Statute[s] 611A.04, subd[ivision] 
l(a) states, ‘[a] request for restitution may include, but is not limited to,’ followed by a 
list of a number of factors that qualify as an economic loss resulting from the 
crime.”). 
 100.  Id.  
 101.  Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 684–85. 
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restitution statute “as a whole.”102 The court pointed to section 
611A.54, which addresses the state-funded victim reparations 
program, and instructed the Crimes Victims Reparations Board to 
consider the “contributory misconduct . . . of a victim” when 
determining the amount of reparations to provide.103 The majority 
concluded that the legislature’s choice to expressly include the 
victim’s fault as a factor in the reparations statute but not the 
parallel restitution statute demonstrates that the legislature 
intended to create an exclusive list of factors in section 611A.045, 
subdivision 1.104 
Second, Riggs argued in the alternative that even if the 
language in section 611A.045 limits the trial court’s consideration 
to the listed factors only, the phrase “as a result of the offense” 
requires the district court to assess the causation of the victim’s loss, 
which would necessarily include consideration of the victim’s 
comparative fault, if any.105 To counter, the State argued that 
criminal sentencing and civil lawsuits, rather than restitution, are 
the proper forums to consider a victim’s fault.106 Unlike the 
restitution statute, the State reasoned, Minnesota criminal 
sentencing and civil liability statutes expressly provide for 
consideration of the victim’s role in causing a harm.107 
Furthermore, it argued that criminal sentencing and civil lawsuits 
serve purposes distinct from restitution.108 According to the State, 
restitution was created by legislation to serve the special purpose of 
restoring criminal victims to their prior financial positions.109 The 
State claimed that a victim’s right to restitution simply attaches 
upon the defendant’s conviction; no additional causation analysis is 
appropriate.110 
Although the restitution statute does contain language 
suggestive of a causation analysis, the majority rejected Riggs’s 
alternative argument.111 The court concluded that the phrase “as a 
 102.  Id. at 683. 
 103.  Id. at 685 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 611A.54(2) (2014)). 
 104.  Id. 
105.  Appellant’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 98, at *13–14. 
106.  Respondent’s Brief, supra note 99, at *6–8. 
 107.  Id. at *7–8. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. at *6–7. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  See State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 685–86 (Minn. 2015). 
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result of the offense” simply directs the district court to consider 
whether the victim’s economic losses are the natural consequences 
of the defendant’s crime; the factors leading to the crime, such as 
an aggressor victim, are immaterial.112 
Disagreeing with the majority’s holding, three justices 
dissented: Chief Justice Gildea, Justice Page, and Justice 
Anderson.113 Justice Page viewed the majority as “speaking out of 
both sides of its mouth.”114 According to Justice Page, although the 
majority stated that it would not consider circumstances 
surrounding the offense when determining a restitution award, the 
court “necessarily considered the circumstances surrounding ‘the 
offense’” because it “permitt[ed] a restitution award based on [an] 
assault” when Riggs had only been convicted of terroristic threats.115 
Justice Page reasoned that based on the majority’s opinion, a 
district court may “consider economic loss resulting from the 
circumstances surrounding the offense of conviction, i.e., the 
assault, to determine restitution” and “the circumstances 
surrounding the assault—including the victim’s role as 
aggressor.”116 
Chief Justice Gildea, joined by Justice Anderson, dissented on 
different grounds. The Chief Justice argued that courts should 
apply “traditional causation analysis” to the restitution statute.117 
According to the Chief Justice, the statutory phrase “as a result of 
the offense” triggers the causation analysis typical of civil cases, 
which permits the consideration of alternative or multiple causes of 
the victim’s loss—causes which could include the victim’s 
contributory fault.118 The majority disagreed, reasoning that 
causation analysis of the victim’s fault belongs to negligence law, 
not restitution calculations in criminal law.119 The majority 
cautioned that the language of the statute demonstrates the 
legislature’s choice to expressly incorporate comparative fault into 
 112.   Id. 
 113.  Id. at 686–88. 
 114.  Id. at 688 (Page, J., dissenting). 
 115.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. at 687 (Gildea, C.J., dissenting). 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. at 686 n.8 (majority opinion). 
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the context of civil liability and criminal reparations but not 
restitution; therefore, the court should not disturb that choice.120 
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Issues of First Impression 
The issues decided by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Riggs 
were issues of first impression. These issues were: first, whether a 
district court may consider only the two explicit factors in section 
611A.045, subdivision 1, when determining restitution,121 and 
second, whether the explicit factors of section 611A.045, even if 
exclusive, nonetheless incorporate consideration of the victim’s 
comparative fault through the causation analysis typically used in 
civil cases.122 Of the few Minnesota Supreme Court cases addressing 
section 611A.045, subdivision 1, a majority of the cases directly 
concern the application of the two statutory factors: the “economic 
loss sustained by the victim” and “the ability of the defendant to 
pay.”123 No previous Minnesota Supreme Court case had addressed 
whether a trial court could consider the victim’s comparative fault 
or any other non-explicit factors in its restitution determination.124 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. at 684 (“[W]e have not determined whether the two express factors in 
section 611A.045, subdivision 1, comprise an exclusive list of the factors that a 
district court may consider when imposing restitution.”). 
 122.  Id. at 685–86. 
 123.  See id. at 683; see, e.g., State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 391 (Minn. 
2011) (concluding that trial court properly considered economic loss of victim 
and offender’s ability to pay despite restitution order’s lack of detail); State v. 
Simion, 745 N.W.2d 830, 844–45 (Minn. 2008) (remanding case to trial court for 
proper calculation of economic loss of victim in light of past payments by 
defendant and the return of stolen property); State v. Lindsey, 632 N.W.2d 652, 
663–64 (Minn. 2001) (concluding that trial court properly considered offender’s 
ability to pay); State v. Tenerelli, 598 N.W.2d 668, 672 (Minn. 1999) (concluding 
that victim’s healing ceremony is not too attenuated from criminal offense to be 
covered as an economic loss); State v. Terpstra, 546 N.W.2d 280, 281–84 (Minn. 
1996) (concluding that overall economic loss of three victims was established by 
the preponderance of the evidence at trial despite the jury convicting the 
defendant of a felony swindle offense against only one of the three victims); State 
v. Maidi, 537 N.W.2d 280, 285–86 (Minn. 1995) (concluding that the legislature
granted courts broad discretion to structure restitution orders that factor in the 
defendant’s ability to pay and that the lower court properly considered those 
resources in its order). 
 124.  See Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 683–85. 
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As this Note will explore, the court correctly concluded that 
the legislature intended the factors listed in 611A.045 to be 
exclusive and correctly declined to read comparative fault into the 
statute.125 First, despite Riggs’s argument that the trial court acted 
within its broad discretion to award or reduce restitution, the 
legislature has limited the trial court’s discretion by enacting the 
mandatory criteria listed in section 611A.045. As the State argued, 
the statute contains no suggestion that trial courts may consider 
any non-explicit factors, such as the victim’s fault.126 The plain 
language of the statute, the context of surrounding statutes, and 
the application of interpretive canons support the majority’s 
conclusion that the legislature intended the listed factors in section 
611A.045 to be exclusive and limiting on trial courts. 
Second, Riggs’s alternative argument that comparative fault is 
incorporated within the existing causation language of the statute 
fails to account for the fact that comparative fault is generally 
applicable to only unintentional, negligent actions. Riggs was 
correct to argue that the language of Minnesota’s restitution statute 
incorporates a causation test reminiscent of civil law; however, as 
the majority responded, even within civil law, the particular test 
Riggs argued for—comparative fault—is inapplicable to intentional 
torts, like battery and assault.127 Because Riggs engaged in 
intentional conduct when defending himself from the eventual 
victim, Riggs’s argument essentially asked the court to recognize an 
inapplicable causation standard—one more appropriate for civil 
negligence. The following sections of this Note expand on the 
analysis of each of Riggs’s arguments. 
B. Discretion of Trial Courts to Make Restitution Determinations 
Generally speaking, trial courts in Minnesota are granted 
broad discretion over restitution awards.128 Riggs’s argument begins 
with the notion that the trial court acted well within its broad 
discretion to reduce the victim’s restitution award.129 
 125.  Id.; see infra Sections IV.C–D. 
 126.  See Respondent’s Brief, supra note 99, at *10; see also MINN. STAT. 
§ 611A.045 (2016).
 127.  Kelzer v. Wachholz, 381 N.W.2d 852, 854 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (citing 
MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1984)) (“Intentional tort actions are not subject to the 
comparative fault statute.”). 
 128.  See Tenerelli, 598 N.W.2d at 671 (citing Maidi, 537 N.W.2d at 284–86). 
129.  Appellant’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 98, at *10–14. 
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At least one appellate case in Minnesota, State v. Ehrmantraut, 
though unpublished and therefore non-precedential,130 lends some 
support to Riggs’s argument. In State v. Ehrmantraut, the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to reduce the 
victim’s restitution award because the victim was the initial 
aggressor.131 The defendant in the case was convicted of third-
degree assault for breaking the victim’s jaw after the victim showed 
up at the defendant’s house and started a fight.132 Like the Riggs 
trial court, the trial court in Ehrmantraut reduced the amount of 
restitution because the victim provoked the conflict that led to his 
injury.133 However, unlike Riggs, the court of appeals in Ehrmantraut 
simply deferred to the trial court’s discretion without addressing 
the deeper statutory issues involving the limits on trial courts to 
consider factors outside of the statute, like the victim’s fault.134 
The trial courts in Riggs and Ehrmantraut departed from 
precedent because trial courts in Minnesota have generally used 
their discretionary authority to expand, rather than reduce, 
restitution awards.135 The use of discretion to expand restitution 
awards follows the broad statutory language addressing the victim’s 
expenses and the defendant’s ability to pay. For example, in State v. 
Maidi¸ the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed a restitution award 
of $147,251.27 for expenses incurred in rescuing an abducted 
child, despite the mathematical impossibility of repayment.136 The 
court concluded that section 609.26, subdivision 4, which provides 
restitution for “any expense” incurred in the return of a child, 
demonstrated the “legislative intent to give wide discretion to the 
 130.  No. A09-880, 2010 WL 2035700 (Minn. Ct. App. May 25, 2010). 
“Unpublished opinions of the Court of Appeals are not precedential.” MINN. STAT. 
§ 480A.08, subdiv. 3(b) (2016).
131.  2010 WL 2035700, at *8 (“Despite some concern about the reasons
supporting reduced restitution . . . [w]e . . . do not interpret the restitution 
adjustment necessarily to contradict the district court’s fact finding, but as the 
district court’s discretionary reduction to acknowledge that Malone unreasonably 
provoked the confrontation to which Ehrmantraut unreasonably responded.”).  
 132.  Id. at *2. 
 133.  Id. at *8. 
 134.  Id. (relying on the trial court’s wide discretion in electing not to interpret 
the restitution adjustment, rather than any statutory factors). 
 135.  See, e.g., State v. Tenerelli, 598 N.W.2d 668, 672 (Minn. 1999); State v. 
Maidi, 537 N.W.2d 280, 285 (Minn. 1995). 
 136.  537 N.W.2d at 285 (discussing the impossibility of repayment due to the 
defendant’s low hourly wage and the effect of compound interest). 
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sentencing court when ordering restitution.”137 The Maidi court 
also compared section 611A.045, concerning the defendant’s 
ability to pay, with section 611A.04, which authorizes trial courts to 
order partial, full, or no restitution.138 Based on the broad language 
in each statute, the court concluded that the legislature “intended 
to give the courts wide flexibility to structure restitution orders that 
take into account a defendant’s ability to pay.”139 
Additionally, in State v. Tenerelli, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
held that a restitution order for repayment of the cost of the 
victim’s Hmong healing ceremony140 qualified as an appropriate 
“economic loss” under section 611A.045.141 The court looked to 
section 611A.04, which stated that compensable losses “may 
include, but is not limited to, any out-of-pocket losses resulting 
from the crime.”142 The court concluded that such language 
“clearly and unambiguously [left] the decision to award restitution 
to the discretion of the trial court.”143 The Tenerelli court recognized 
that section 611A.04 gives trial courts “significant discretion” over 
restitution when it concerns expanding the scope of the victim’s 
expenses.144 
An important distinction between Riggs, Maidi, and Tenerelli is 
that the latter cases concern trial courts’ broad discretion over the 
factors already identified in the restitution statute.145 Minnesota has 
not recognized a trial court’s broad discretion to consider any 
factor when awarding restitution. The Riggs trial court exceeded its 
discretionary authority by considering factors beyond the factors 
mentioned in the statute. This conclusion is reinforced by the 
statutory analysis of section 611A.045. 
C. Minnesota Statutes Section 611A.045 Establishes Exclusive Criteria 
for Determining Restitution 
Upon analyzing section 611A.045, the Riggs court correctly 
decided that the legislature enacted exclusive criteria. The Riggs 
 137.  Id. at 284. 
 138.  Id. at 285–86. 
 139.  Id. 
140.  Tenerelli, 598 N.W.2d at 669. 
 141.  Id. at 672. 
 142.  Id. at 671 (citing MINN. STAT. § 611A.04 (1999)). 
 143.  Id. at 672. 
 144.  Id. at 671. 
 145.  See MINN. STAT. §§ 611A.045, .04 (2016). 
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court applied statutory interpretation to evaluate section 611A.045 
in light of the defendant’s claim that the statute did not restrict the 
trial court from considering unspecified factors in determining 
restitution.146 
1. Canons of Statutory Interpretation
The court’s primary objective in statutory interpretation is 
always to “effectuate the intent of the legislature.”147 Restitution 
cases have reinforced this objective.148 Questions of statutory 
interpretation are reviewed de novo.149 
The first step in statutory interpretation is to determine 
whether a statute is ambiguous.150 A statute is ambiguous only 
where it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation.151 
To determine whether a statute is capable of more than one 
reasonable interpretation, the court may use a number of 
interpretative steps.152 The court first interprets the statute 
according to the plain and ordinary meaning of its words and the 
common rules of grammar.153 The statute is also read with the 
presumption that all of its words have effect and none are 
superfluous.154 The court interprets the statute’s meaning in the 
context of the surrounding statutory sections to avoid conflicting 
 146.  See State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Minn. 2015). 
 147.  MINN. STAT. § 645.16; see Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 682; State v. Jones, 848 
N.W.2d 528, 535 (Minn. 2014). 
 148.  See Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 682; State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 382 
(Minn. 2011); State v. Gaiovnik, 794 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 2011); Tenerelli, 598 
N.W.2d at 671. 
 149.  See Tenerelli, 598 N.W.2d at 671 (citing Doe v. Minn. State Bd. of Med. 
Exam’rs, 435 N.W.2d 45, 48 (Minn. 1989)). 
 150.  See State v. Peck, 773 N.W.2d 768, 772 (Minn. 2009). 
 151.  See State v. Mauer, 741 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn. 2007). 
 152.  See MINN. STAT. § 645.08; Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 682–83. 
 153.  See MINN. STAT. § 645.08(1); State v. Jones, 848 N.W.2d 528, 535 (Minn. 
2014) (citing State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Minn. 2012)); Peck, 773 N.W.2d 
at 772. 
 154.  See MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (“Every law shall be construed, if possible, to 
give effect to all its provisions.”); State v. Rick, 835 N.W.2d 478, 483 (Minn. 2013) 
(citing Amaral v. St. Cloud Hosp., 598 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Minn. 1999)) (“Whenever 
it is possible, no word, phrase, or sentence should be deemed superfluous, void, or 
insignificant.”); Am. Family Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn. 
2000).  
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interpretations.155 Lastly, the court applies additional interpretative 
canons identified in statutes156 or case law, where relevant.157 
After applying the interpretive steps, if the court determines 
that a statute’s meaning is clear and unambiguous, it must apply 
the plain meaning of the statute.158 The statute’s plain meaning is 
presumed to convey the intent of the legislature.159 Only where the 
court concludes that a statute is ambiguous may the court attempt 
to discern the legislature’s intent through statutory construction.160 
2. Application of Statutory Interpretation to Riggs’s Primary
Argument
The Riggs case illustrates the sometimes circuitous nature of 
statutory interpretation. Two courts looked at the same statute and 
took different conclusions regarding statutory interpretation: the 
court of appeals concluded that section 611A.045, subdivision 1, 
was ambiguous,161 while the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded 
 155.  See Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Minn. 2013) (citing 
Martin v. Dicklich, 823 N.W.2d 336, 344 (Minn. 2012)) (“Multiple parts of a 
statute may be read together so as to ascertain whether the statute is ambiguous.”); 
State v. Gaiovnik, 794 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 2011) (quoting Christensen v. 
Hennepin Transp. Co., Inc., 215 Minn. 394, 409, 10 N.W.2d 406, 415 (1943)) 
(“When interpreting statutes, we do not examine different provisions in isolation. 
Instead, we construe a statute ‘as a whole,’ and ‘[w]ords and sentences are 
understood . . . in the light of their context.’”); Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d at 277. 
 156.  See MINN. STAT. § 645.08. 
 157.  See, e.g., Rick, 835 N.W.2d at 485 (“Under the associated-words canon, 
when context suggests that a group of words have something in common, each 
word should be ascribed a meaning that is consistent with its accompanying 
words.”); see also Laase v. 2007 Chevrolet Tahoe, 776 N.W.2d 431, 436 (Minn. 
2009) (discussing the application of canons of interpretation unless they would 
defeat the legislature’s intent or result in a construction that is repugnant to 
statute); Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d at 278 (citing Erickson v. Sunset Mem’l Park Ass’n, 
259 Minn. 532, 543, 108 N.W.2d 434, 441 (1961)) (“[C]ourts should construe a 
statute to avoid absurd results and unjust consequences.”). 
 158.  See State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 382 (Minn. 2011) (citing MINN.
STAT. § 645.16 (2010)). 
 159.  See State v. Jones, 848 N.W.2d 528, 535 (Minn. 2014) (citing Am. Tower, 
L.P. v. City of Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Minn. 2001)). 
 160.  See Rick, 835 N.W.2d at 482 (discussing Minnesota Statutes section 645.16 
(2012) as listing canons of construction used to determine legislative intent for an 
ambiguous statute). 
 161.  See State v. Riggs, 845 N.W.2d 236, 238 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014), aff’d, 865 
N.W.2d 679 (Minn. 2015). 
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that it was not.162 However, despite the fact that the two courts took 
different interpretive paths, each arrived at the same final 
conclusion: the legislature intended the statutory factors to be the 
exclusive criteria for determining restitution.163 In reaching their 
conclusions, both courts applied a similar interpretative principle: 
omitted phrases are presumed to be intentionally excluded by the 
legislature.164 
The presumption that omissions in a statute are intentional is 
known as the expressio unius canon.165 Expressio unius means that the 
expression of one term implies the exclusion of the omitted 
term.166 Courts often look to the canon when deciding whether the 
language of a statute is exclusive or inclusive of things not 
expressed.167 Under the canon, “[w]here a statute enumerates the 
persons or things to be affected by its provisions, there is an 
implied exclusion of others.”168 Expressio unius is not to be used in a 
 162.  See Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 685. 
 163.  Id.; see also Riggs, 845 N.W.2d at 239. 
 164.  See Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 685 (“[W]e cannot glean from the Legislature’s 
omission its intention to include an unstated factor.”); Riggs, 845 N.W.2d at 238 
(citing City of Moorhead v. Red River Valley Coop. Power Ass’n, 811 N.W.2d 151, 
159 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012)) (“Generally, when the legislature omits something 
from a statute, we infer that the omission was intentional.”). 
 165.  See State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 383 (Minn. 2011) (citing 2A 
NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
§ 47.25 (7th ed. 2007)) (“Expressio unius generally reflects an inference that any
omissions in a statute are intentional.”). The full Latin phrase is expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius (“The expression of one thing is to the exclusion of another.”). See 
id. 
 166.  See id. (citing In re Welfare of J.B., 782 N.W.2d 535, 543 (Minn. 2010); In 
re Common Sch. Dist. No. 1317, 263 Minn. 573, 575, 117 N.W.2d 390, 391 (1962)). 
 167.  See, e.g., Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d at 383 (rejecting the inference of expressio 
unius where the list of enumerated terms encompass the allegedly omitted term); 
Nelson v. Productive Alternatives, Inc., 715 N.W.2d 452, 457 (Minn. 2006) 
(accepting the application of expressio unius where the contested term is not listed 
among the various terms); Peterson v. City of Minneapolis, 878 N.W.2d 521, 524–
25 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016), aff’d, No. A15-1711, 2017 WL 1364085 (Minn. Apr. 12, 
2017) (rejecting the inference of expressio unius where the phrase “including” 
prefaces a list of terms). 
 168.  See City of Saint Paul v. Eldredge, 788 N.W.2d 522, 525 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2010) (quoting Maytag Co. v. Comm’r of Taxation, 218 Minn. 460, 463, 17 N.W.2d 
37, 40 (1944)), aff’d, 800 N.W.2d 643 (Minn. 2011). See generally MINN. STAT. 
§ 645.19 (2012); Niska v. Clayton, No. A13-0622, 2014 WL 902680, at *9 (Minn. Ct.
App. Mar. 10, 2014) (citing Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d at 383), review denied, (June 25, 
2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1399 (2015). 
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rote manner; it is highly context-dependent, and interpreting 
courts must consider whether the statute reasonably expresses all it 
was meant to prescribe.169 For statutory lists, expressio unius applies 
when the “items expressed are members of an associated group or 
series, justifying the inference that items not mentioned were 
excluded by deliberate choice, not inadvertence.”170 
Minnesota courts commonly employ expressio unius to interpret 
statutes, yet Minnesota’s case law is unclear as to precisely when 
courts may apply it. Some courts have used expressio unius as a guide 
to interpret the plain meaning of a statute; others have applied it 
only after finding the statute ambiguous. For instance, the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals has used expressio unius both before 
and after determining the ambiguity of a statute.171 Yet, in dicta, the 
court suggested that expressio unius “is only used where it is first 
 169.  See Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532, 535 n.3 (Minn. 2013) (citing 
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS 107 (2012)) (discussing that the application of expressio unius is greatly 
dependent on context and common sense to determine whether the item(s) 
specified can reasonably be thought to express all that the statute was intended to 
grant or prohibit). 
 170.  Mountain Peaks Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Roth-Steffen, 778 N.W.2d 380, 384 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 
(2003)). 
 171.  See In re Xcel’s Request to Issue Renewable Dev. Fund Cycle 4 Requests 
for Proposals, No. A14-1006, 2015 WL 2341257, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. May 18, 
2015) (labeling expressio unius as a canon of construction that applies only if the 
statute is ambiguous); RSR, Inc. v. Rothers, No. A13-1208, 2014 WL 996874, at *3 
(Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2014) (applying expressio unius to interpret list of 
provisions in Minnesota Statutes section 571.75, subdivision 1, after concluding 
the statute was ambiguous); Mountain Peaks Fin. Servs., 778 N.W.2d at 384 
(applying expressio unius as a rule of statutory construction only after concluding 
the statutory list capable of two reasonable interpretations); BCBSM, Inc. v. Minn. 
Comprehensive Health Ass’n, 713 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (applying 
expressio unius as a rule of construction to determine legislative intent only after 
concluding the statute was ambiguous). But see Persigehl v. Ridgebrook Invs. Ltd. 
P’ship, 858 N.W.2d 824, 831–34 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015) (analyzing the applicability 
of expressio unius in the process of determining that the statutory list was 
unambiguous); City of Moorhead v. Red River Valley Co-op. Power Ass’n, 811 
N.W.2d 151, 159 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d, 830 N.W.2d 32 (Minn. 2013) 
(applying expressio unius to interpret the plain language of a four-factor statutory 
list without first declaring the statute ambiguous); Underwood Grain Co. v. 
Harthun, 563 N.W.2d 278, 281 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (relying on expressio unius as 
a “principle of statutory construction” to reject inserting an omitted phrase into a 
list of statutory provisions and concluding the statute was unambiguous). 
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determined that the language is ambiguous.”172 Likewise, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court has called expressio unius a “canon of 
construction”173 to be used only if a statute is ambiguous.174 At other 
times, however, the court has used expressio unius to interpret plain 
meaning.175 Nevertheless, the confusion surrounding expressio unius 
ultimately may be a distinction without a difference. Whether 
expressio unius is applied before or after determining the ambiguity 
of a statute, the conclusion it led to in Riggs was well-founded. 
In Riggs, the court did not specifically announce that it relied 
on the expressio unius canon to reach its conclusion.176 Indeed, the 
court staked much of its reasoning on the rules of grammar and 
past precedent.177 However, the expressio unius principle underlies 
 172.  See Walser Auto Sales, Inc. v. City of Richfield, 635 N.W.2d 391, 397 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Colangelo v. Norwest Mortgage, Inc., 598 N.W.2d 
14, 17–18 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999)), aff’d, 644 N.W.2d 425 (Minn. 2002). 
 173.  See Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud, 853 N.W.2d 713, 718–19 (Minn. 2014). 
 174.  See Billion v. Comm’r of Revenue, 827 N.W.2d 773, 778 (Minn. 2013) 
(citing Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992)) (explaining 
that canons of construction are inapplicable unless a statute is ambiguous). 
 175.  See Gams v. Houghton, No. A14-1747, 2016 WL 4536500, at *3–4 (Minn. 
Aug. 31, 2016) (citing City of Saint Paul v. Eldredge, 800 N.W.2d 643, 648 (Minn. 
2011)) (relying on the “maxim that when there is an express enumeration of the 
persons or things to be affected by a particular provision, ‘there is an implied 
exclusion of others’” in concluding that the statute was unambiguous); Rohmiller 
v. Hart, 811 N.W.2d 585, 590–91 (Minn. 2012) (quoting Wallace v. Comm’r of
Taxation, 289 Minn. 220, 230, 184 N.W.2d 588, 594 (1971)) (concluding that 
where a statute identified the class of persons to which its rule applied, the court 
“cannot supply that which the legislature purposely omits or inadvertently 
overlooks,” and holding that the statute is not ambiguous where the legislature is 
silent); Anderson v. Twin City Rapid Transit Co., 250 Minn. 167, 175, 84 N.W.2d 
593, 599–600 (1957) (concluding that the provisions of a contract were exclusive 
and unambiguous after applying expressio unius and declaring that the canon is 
applicable to statutes as well); cf. In re Welfare of J.B., 782 N.W.2d 535, 543 (Minn. 
2010) (applying expressio unius to interpret the statute as not requiring public 
defender representation of parents in a juvenile proceeding while later declaring 
legislative history inapplicable unless a statute is ambiguous). But see In re 
Guardianship of Tschumy, 853 N.W.2d 728, 749–50 (Minn. 2014) (Anderson, J., 
dissenting) (discussing the applicability of canons of construction, like expressio 
unius, only where the statute is ambiguous). 
 176.  See generally State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679 (Minn. 2015). 
 177.  The Riggs court relied on its statutory interpretation in State v. Hohenwald 
for the conclusion that whenever the legislature used the article “the”—as in, “the 
following factors”—it necessarily intended to create an exclusive list. However, the 
court’s use of Hohenwald appears to be dubious because Riggs extrapolates 
Hohenwald’s analysis from the singular to plural. Hohenwald addressed whether the 
23
Anderson: Criminal Law: The System is Rigged: Criminal Restitution Is Blind
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2017
  
2017] STATE V. RIGGS 163 
its analysis. Because expressio unius is context-dependent,178 courts 
typically test its exclusionary presumption by scanning the 
surrounding statutory language for any inclusive terms or other 
indicators that the scope of the statute includes unexpressed 
items.179 Likewise, the Riggs court announced that, as an 
interpretive step, it would consider the statute as a whole and 
interpret section 611A.045 in context with the surrounding 
statutory provisions.180 This interpretive step demonstrates the 
court’s use of the expressio unius canon. 
The Riggs court followed the proper analytical steps for testing 
the expressio unius exclusionary presumption against the language 
of the statute and the surrounding statutory context.181 The court 
first looked to section 611A.045 and concluded that there was no 
inclusive language, such as “the district court shall consider at least 
the following factors” or “among the factors that the district court 
shall consider are,” to indicate that additional factors could be 
considered.182 The court then analyzed the surrounding statutes, 
section 611A.04 (authorizing restitution orders) and section 
611A.54 (addressing state-funded reparations for victims of 
crime).183 Interpreting section 611A.04, the statute immediately 
preceding section 611A.045, the court reasoned that the legislature 
article “the” provided an exclusive meaning for a single item in a list and not 
whether the article “the” provided an exclusive meaning over an entire list of 
factors. See id. at 685 (quoting State v. Hohenwald, 815 N.W.2d 823, 830 (Minn. 
2012)) (“We held in Hohenwald that ‘[t]he definite article “the” is a word of 
limitation that indicates a reference to a specific object.’”); Hohenwald, 815 N.W.2d 
at 830 (“The use of the word ‘the’ before ‘criminal proceedings’ in Rule 20.01 
provides further evidence that the suspension order entered by the district court 
affected only the case already initiated against Hohenwald by criminal complaint. 
The definite article ‘the’ is a word of limitation that indicates a reference to a 
specific object.”). 
 178.  See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 169, at 107. 
 179.  See, e.g., Rohmiller v. Hart, 811 N.W.2d 585, 590–91(Minn. 2012); Nelson 
v. Productive Alternatives, Inc., 715 N.W.2d 452, 456–57 (Minn. 2006).
 180.  See Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 683. 
 181.  See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 169; see also Rohmiller, 811 N.W.2d at 591 
(holding that a statute that expressly provided rights for identified category of 
individuals but was silent as to other categories of individuals was not ambiguous 
after applying the principle that courts cannot supply words that the legislature 
has intentionally omitted by examining surrounding statutory provisions for 
context). 
 182.  Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 684. 
 183.  Id. at 685. 
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used the words “may include, but is not limited to” to create an 
inclusive, rather than exclusive, statutory list.184 Interpreting section 
611A.54, the court concluded that a victim’s contributory 
misconduct is expressly listed as a factor in determining victim 
reparations.185 
To the Riggs court, the statutory context surrounding section 
611A.045 illustrated the language available to the legislature. Had 
the legislature intended the restitution statute to permit the 
consideration of additional factors, it would have indicated its 
intention by using broad or inclusive language such as “includes” 
or “at least” to introduce the restitution criteria.186 Based on this 
context, the Riggs court applied the expressio unius principle, stating 
that “[w]ithout more, we cannot glean from the Legislature’s 
omission its intention to include an unstated factor.”187 On that 
basis, the court found the meaning of the statute unambiguous and 
exclusive.188 
Other Minnesota case law discussing statutory interpretation 
reinforces the court’s analysis. For example, in Nelson v. Productive 
Alternatives, Inc., the parties disputed whether Minnesota Statutes 
chapter 317A, which grants certain protections for members of 
nonprofit corporations, also protects against retaliatory 
termination.189 The court reviewed the provisions of the chapter 
and found no language indicative of protection against 
retaliation.190 The court then applied expressio unius to conclude 
that the statute demonstrated the legislature’s intent to not offer 
 184.  Id. (emphasis in original).  
 185.  Id.  
 186.  Id.  
 187.  Id. 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  See Nelson v. Productive Alternatives, Inc., 715 N.W.2d 452, 456 (Minn. 
2006). 
 190.  Id. at 456–57. 
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such protection.191 The court held that the legislature, not the 
court, would have to make any future modifications to the law.192 
Rohmiller v. Hart is another statutory interpretation case that, 
like Riggs, applied expressio unius. In Rohmiller, the plaintiff argued 
that Minnesota Statutes section 257C.08 was ambiguous because it 
expressly provided minor child visitation rights to a subset of 
individuals, but it was silent as to the visitation rights of aunts.193 
The court looked to the various provisions of the statute and found 
that the statute delineated the visitation rights of many categories 
of individuals and made no mention of aunts.194 While not 
specifically announcing application of expressio unius, the court 
relied on its underlying principle: omissions are presumed 
intentional.195 The court concluded that the statute was 
unambiguous and reflected the legislature’s intent to not include 
aunts among those individuals with visitation rights.196 
Anderson v. Twin City Rapid Transit Co. is a contract 
interpretation case that also used expressio unius to reach the 
conclusion that terms not expressed should not be 
acknowledged.197 In Anderson, the parties disputed whether the 
term “layoff” in their labor agreement also encompassed a 
“discharge.”198 The court relied on the expressio unius exclusionary 
principle to guide its reasoning that the recognition of discharge 
would impermissibly modify the contract by creating an 
unexpressed exception.199 In a similar fashion, the Riggs court 
 191.  Id. at 457 (“[W]e abide by the canon of statutory construction ‘expressio 
unius exclusio alterius,’ meaning the expression of one thing is the exclusion of 
another . . . . That is, since the legislature has extensively expressed the rights and 
privileges of membership in a nonprofit corporation, and since protection from 
reprisal employment discharge is not among these express protections, we must 
conclude that the legislature meant not to protect members from such 
practices.”). 
 192.  Id. 
193.  Rohmiller v. Hart, 811 N.W.2d 585, 590 (Minn. 2012). 
 194.  Id. at 590–91. 
 195.  Id. at 591 (quoting Wallace v. Comm’r of Taxation, 289 Minn. 220, 230, 
184 N.W.2d 588, 594 (1971)). 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  See Anderson v. Twin City Rapid Transit Co., 250 Minn. 167, 175–76, 84 
N.W.2d 593, 599 (1957) (“This [exclusionary] rule is applicable to contracts as 
well as to statutes . . . .”). 
 198.  See id. at 173, 84 N.W.2d at 597. 
 199.  See id. at 175–76, 84 N.W.2d at 599. 
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declined to recognize comparative fault, in part, because it would 
impermissibly modify section 611A.045.200 
A number of statutory interpretation cases demonstrate the 
type of inclusive language that overcomes the exclusionary 
presumption of expressio unius. Had the Riggs court found any such 
inclusive language surrounding section 611A.045, it would have 
been justified in reaching a different conclusion. For instance, in 
Peterson v. City of Minneapolis, the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
declined to apply expressio unius to a list of statutory criteria because 
the statute introduced the criteria using the word “including.”201 
This term, according to the court, demonstrated the legislature’s 
intent that the statutory list be non-exclusive.202 In a similar case, 
City of Moorhead v. Red River Valley Co-op, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court held that expressio unius did not apply to a four-factor statute 
because the statute introduced the factors using the words “must 
include” and featured a catch-all fourth factor, “other appropriate 
factors.”203 Finally, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in State v. 
Caldwell, held that the presumption of expressio unis is overcome 
when the supposed omitted term is obviously encompassed by the 
enumerated terms of a statute.204 The statute at issue in Riggs 
contained no similarly broad or inclusive language. 
In summary, the relevant statutory context reinforces, rather 
than overcomes, the application of expressio unius for interpreting 
section 611A.045 in Riggs. Moreover, section 611A.045 and its 
surrounding statutes lack any indicators of inclusive language or 
intent.205 Furthermore, section 611A.54 provides an additional 
point of reference where the legislature expressly adopted the 
victim’s contributory fault as a factor in the similar reparations 
statute.206 Thus, as the Riggs court correctly determined, application 
of the exclusionary principle leads to the conclusion that the 
factors listed in section 611A.045 are intentionally exclusive. 
 200.  See State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 686 n.8 (Minn. 2015). 
 201.  Peterson v. City of Minneapolis, 878 N.W.2d 521, 524 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2016), aff’d, No. A15-1711, 2017 WL 1364085 (Minn. Apr. 12, 2017). 
 202.  Id. at 524–25. 
 203.  See City of Moorhead v. Red River Valley Coop. Power Ass’n, 830 N.W.2d 
32, 39 (Minn. 2013). 
204.  State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 383 (Minn. 2011). 
 205.  See supra notes 178–85. 
 206.  See supra note 180. 
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D. Minnesota Statutes Section 611A.045 Does Not Incorporate 
Comparative Fault Causation into Restitution Calculations 
This section addresses Riggs’s alternative argument. As 
detailed earlier, Riggs argued that even if the factors listed in the 
statute are exclusive, the statute’s express language still triggers the 
causation analysis typically used in civil cases, which, in turn, allows 
consideration of comparative fault.207 
Riggs was correct to argue that in spite of the statute’s 
exclusive restitution criteria, the language of the statute still 
requires the trial court to analyze causation in order to determine 
whether the victim’s losses are, in fact, the result of the offender’s 
crime. The pertinent question is: what kind of causation test 
applies to restitution? Restitution cases in Minnesota make clear 
that trial courts should apply a causation test reminiscent of the 
proximate cause test in civil law.208 Just as the Chief Justice reasoned 
in her dissent, Riggs asserted that such a causation test necessarily 
includes the victim’s comparative fault.209 As the following analysis 
will show, the Riggs court rightly recognized that reading 
comparative fault into the statute was a bridge too far. Before 
examining Riggs’s alternative argument, it is necessary to 
understand how courts in Minnesota have analyzed and applied 
causation in the restitution context. 
1. Restitution Requires a Proximate Causal Link Between the
Victim’s Losses and the Course of the Offender’s Criminal
Conduct
Minnesota’s restitution statute does not identify a particular 
causation test.210 As previously stated, section 611A.045, subdivision 
1(a), simply directs the trial court to determine the value of the 
economic loss sustained by the victim “as a result of the offense.”211 
Section 611A.04 defines the victim’s losses in a similar fashion—
 207.  See Appellant’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 98, at *13–14. 
 208.  See infra notes 222–30 and accompanying text. 
209.  State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 686–87 (Minn. 2015) (Gildea, C.J., 
dissenting); Appellant’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 98, at *12. 
 210.  Compare MINN. STAT. § 611A.04 (2016), and id. § 611A.045, with 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2259 (b)(3)(f) (2016) (mandating federal restitution for the losses of sexual
exploitation victims sustained “as a proximate result of the offense”). See also 
Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1720 (2014) (holding that 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2259 creates a proximate cause requirement).
 211.  See MINN. STAT. § 611A.045. 
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compensable losses are the losses “resulting from the crime.”212 
Courts have interpreted this language to require the state to prove 
that the victim’s losses are “directly caused by the [offender’s 
criminal] conduct.”213 The Minnesota Court of Appeals has 
referred to this relationship as a “direct causal link.”214 Applying this 
standard, the trial judge must ensure that the record establishes a 
factual basis for the restitution award215 that connects the victim’s 
loss to the crime.216 
Under this approach, restitution may be ordered “only for 
losses directly caused by [the] actions” for which the defendant was 
convicted.217 At first glance, it may seem that restitution is allowed 
only for those losses caused by the specific offense for which the 
defendant is convicted. Indeed, Justice Page focused much of his 
Riggs dissent upon this point.218 However, from early on, Minnesota 
courts have taken a broad view of the offender’s criminal conduct, 
in which restitution is appropriate for losses arising from any part 
of a single course of criminal conduct, regardless of the specific 
offense of conviction.219 
 212.  See id. § 611A.04, subdiv. 1(a). 
 213.  State v. Maxwell, 802 N.W.2d 849, 852 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting 
State v. Latimer, 604 N.W.2d 103, 105 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999)); State v. Nelson, 796 
N.W.2d 343, 347 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (same); see also State v. Olson, 381 N.W.2d 
899, 901 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). 
 214.  See Maxwell, 802 N.W.2d at 852. 
 215.  See Latimer, 604 N.W.2d at 105 (citing State v. Fader, 358 N.W.2d 42, 48 
(Minn. 1984)). 
 216.  See Nelson, 796 N.W.2d at 347 (citing Latimer, 604 N.W.2d at 105). 
 217.  Id.; see also Maxwell, 802 N.W.2d at 852; Olson, 381 N.W.2d at 901. 
 218.  Justice Page argued that the only reasonable plain language 
interpretation of “offense” from section 611A.045 is the offense of conviction. For 
support, Page pointed to section 611A.04, a surrounding statute, which conditions 
restitution on whether the offender is convicted. See State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 
679, 688 (Minn. 2015) (Page, J., dissenting). 
 219.  See, e.g., State v. Terpstra, 546 N.W.2d 280, 283 (Minn. 1996) (confirming 
that the total amount of restitution is not limited by the crime of conviction 
because as long as the defendant is convicted of a related crime and the victim’s 
losses are established by a preponderance of the evidence, the restitution order is 
proper); Latimer, 604 N.W.2d at 105–06 (reversing trial court’s restitution order 
because Latimer’s acts were separate from the murder and Latimer could only be 
ordered to pay restitution for expenses directly caused by Latimer’s participation 
in the concealment of the murder); State v. Esler, 553 N.W.2d 61, 63–65 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1996) (reversing the trial court’s restitution order because a restitution 
order for losses arising from multiple offenses must be linked to the crime of 
conviction by the same behavior); Olson, 381 N.W.2d at 900 (affirming the 
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Case law in Minnesota demonstrates that the causation test for 
restitution has evolved over time. Initially, courts applied a but-for 
test to the causal relationship between the victim’s losses and the 
offender’s conduct. Eventually, however, courts began to use a 
causation test similar to the proximate cause test used in civil law. 
Prior to State v. Palubicki,220 Minnesota courts assessed the 
causal link between a victim’s loss and the offender’s crime using a 
but-for test.221 But-for causation means that a later event would not 
have occurred “but for” the former event.222 Under but-for 
causation, the court asked whether, under identical circumstances, 
the injury would occur absent the offender’s crime.223 
However, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected but-for 
causation as the state’s causation standard for restitution in State v. 
Palubicki.224 In Palubicki, the trial court granted restitution to the 
children of a murder victim for their lodging and travel expenses 
related to attending the defendant’s murder trial.225 Relying on 
precedent, the state argued that the expenses were the but-for 
result of the defendant’s offense.226 The defendant urged the court 
to limit the scope of restitution claims.227 The court agreed, and in 
rejecting the but-for test, the court held that a restitution claim “so 
attenuated in its cause that it cannot be said to result from the 
restitution order because the trial evidence directly linked the business’s losses to 
the defendant’s burglary and reasoning that if the defendant had been acquitted 
of a theft involving a separate incident from the burglary, the restitution order 
would be improper). 
220.  727 N.W.2d 662 (2007). 
 221.  See State v. Hillbrant, No. A05-820, 2006 WL 2052872, at *6 (Minn. Ct. 
App. July 25, 2006) (citing In re Welfare of D.D.G., 532 N.W.2d 279, 282–83 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1995)) (“Minnesota courts apply a but-for analysis when considering 
whether a victim’s economic harm was directly caused by a defendant’s criminal 
conduct.”), abrogated by Palubicki, 727 N.W.2d 662; State v. O’Brien, 459 N.W.2d 
131, 134–35 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). 
 222.  But-For Cause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“[But-for cause 
is] [t]he cause without which the event could not have occurred.Also termed 
actual cause; cause in fact; factual cause.”); see also Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 
1710, 1722 (2014). 
 223.  See George v. Estate of Baker, 724 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 2006) (citing W. 
PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 265 (5th 
ed. 1984)). 
 224.  Palubicki, 727 N.W.2d at 667. 
 225.  Id. at 664–65. 
 226.  Id. at 667.  
 227.  Id. at 666. 
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defendant’s criminal act” violates the statute.228 Still, applying this 
standard, the court affirmed the restitution order, concluding that 
the trial attendance expenses were not too attenuated and were the 
“direct result of [Palubicki’s] crime.”229 
The Palubicki holding signified the court’s acceptance of 
“direct cause” rather than but-for cause as the causation standard 
for restitution in Minnesota.230 Direct cause, after Palubicki, is 
synonymous with proximate cause in civil law.231 Proximate cause 
generally requires, first, the existence of but-for cause, and second, 
a direct relationship between the injury and the harmful conduct, 
such that the injury is not so attenuated from the conduct that the 
injury “is more aptly described as mere fortuity.”232 However, as this 
Note will discuss in greater detail, contrary to Riggs’s argument, 
proximate cause in the restitution context does not necessarily 
require the inclusion of comparative fault. 
Perhaps because Palubicki provided no examples of the types of 
restitution claims that should be rejected,233 so far, with rare 
exception, few restitution awards following Palubicki have been 
reversed because the victim’s loss was too attenuated from the 
defendant’s conduct.234 Post-Palubicki cases have applied proximate 
 228.  Id. at 667.  
 229.  See id. 
230.  After rejecting but-for causation, the Palubicki court used the term, 
“direct result of,” to test the attenuation of the disputed restitution award. Id. The 
term “direct result” is synonymous with proximate cause, as used in civil liability in 
Minnesota. See George v. Estate of Baker, 724 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2006) (citing 4 
MINN. DIST. JUDGES ASS’N, MINNESOTA PRACTICE, JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, CIVIL, 
CIVJIG 27.10 (4th ed. 1999)) (“Minnesota applies the substantial factor test for 
causation. The negligent act is a direct, or proximate, cause of harm if the act was a 
substantial factor in the harm’s occurrence.” (emphasis added)). 
 231.  See 4 MINN. DIST. JUDGES ASS’N, MINNESOTA PRACTICE, JURY INSTRUCTION 
GUIDES, CIVIL, CIVJIG 27.10 (6th ed. 2015), Westlaw. 
 232.  See Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2014) (quoting 
Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 838–39 (1996)). 
 233.  See generally Palubicki, 727 N.W.2d 662. 
 234.  See Powell v. State, No. A14-1406, 2015 WL 4393381, at *6 (Minn. Ct. 
App. July 20, 2015) (ordering partial reversal of restitution order for over-the-
counter drugs, improperly included in restitution for prescription costs, as too 
attenuated). But see State v. Rodriguez, 863 N.W.2d 424, 430 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015) 
(holding restitution for victim’s moving expenses not too attenuated because of 
psychological trauma from defendant’s break-in), review denied, (July 21, 2015); 
Martel v. State, No. A14-2156, 2015 WL 4171887, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. July 13, 
2015) (holding restitution for victim’s colonoscopy to examine diarrhea symptoms 
following defendant’s indecent exposure not too attenuated); State v. Berkness, 
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cause to test the restitution award.235 For example, several 
unpublished court of appeals cases have held that the victim’s loss 
“must be ‘a reasonably foreseeable result of, and [be] directly 
caused by, [a defendant’s] actions.’”236 Notably, however, neither 
Palubicki nor any restitution case following Palubicki specifically 
addressed the comparative fault of a victim in the proximate direct 
cause analysis.237 
In addition to the proximate cause test recognized in Palubicki, 
other restitution cases demonstrate that trial courts may also 
consider multiple causes in their analysis of the victim’s losses.238 
However, as with the Palubicki line of cases, no restitution case has 
gone as far as to recognize the fault of the victim as a potential 
contributory cause. For example, in State v. Nelson, the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals assessed multiple causes when determining the 
factual connection between the victim’s loss and the offender’s 
conduct.239 In Nelson, a tanning salon employee pled guilty to one 
misdemeanor for theft from the salon and was ordered to pay 
restitution.240 Charges were also brought against three coworkers 
but later dismissed.241 The court of appeals modified the restitution 
order because the order impermissibly included losses that flowed 
No. A14-1678, 2015 WL 1608992, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2015), review 
denied, (June 16, 2015) (holding restitution for victim’s medical treatment from 
bite of defendant’s non-immunized dog not too attenuated); State v. Shakibi, No. 
A14-0242, 2014 WL 6609082, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2014) (holding that 
restitution for damage to car driven but not owned by victim not too attenuated 
from defendant’s reckless driving crime); State v. Alford, No. A07-1025, 2008 WL 
4006657, at *7 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2008) (holding restitution for fire damage 
to mobile home from fire set by defendant’s brother to cover murder not too 
attenuated because both participated in the murder); State v. Spann, No. A05-
2372, 2007 WL 968421, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2007) (holding restitution 
for stolen car, lost due to police auction, not too attenuated from criminal’s initial 
theft of car). 
 235.  See, e.g., Rodriguez, 863 N.W.2d at 429 (citing Palubicki, 727 N.W.2d at 
667); Berkness, 2015 WL 1608992, at *2; Alford, 2008 WL 4006657, at *7. 
 236.  Powell, 2015 WL 4393381, at *3 (quoting State v. Maxwell, 802 N.W.2d 
849, 853 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011)); see also Berkness, 2015 WL 1608992, at *2; Shakibi, 
2014 WL 6609082, at *3; Spann, 2007 WL 968421, at *3. 
 237.  See generally Palubicki, 727 N.W.2d at 662. 
 238.  This point went unacknowledged by the Riggs court. See State v. Riggs, 
865 N.W.2d 679, 679 (Minn. 2015). 
 239.  See State v. Nelson, 796 N.W.2d 343 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011). 
 240.  See id. at 348.  
 241.  Id. 
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directly from the coworkers’ conduct rather than the defendant’s 
conduct.242 
Additionally, in State v. Spann, an unpublished Minnesota 
Court of Appeals case, the defendant was convicted of car theft and 
ordered to pay restitution to the victim.243 Upon recovering the 
victim’s car, the police refused to return it to the victim because he 
lacked insurance, and the police subsequently auctioned the stolen 
vehicle and kept the proceeds.244 At the restitution hearing, the trial 
judge said to the defendant, “As far as restitution is concerned . . . 
I’m not going to order that you pay the full purchase price of the 
car, Mr. Spann. I just don’t think it’s fair.”245 The court of appeals 
affirmed the restitution award, reasoning that partial restitution was 
justified because a portion of the victim’s losses may have been 
caused by the police rather than the defendant.246 
However, State v. Miller presents a counterpoint, suggesting 
that when in doubt, courts should favor the victim over the 
defendant in their causation analysis.247 Miller held that the trial 
court is not required to tie specific losses to the actions of a single 
defendant where the victim’s losses were caused by multiple 
individuals.248 In the case, Miller and another individual teamed up 
to fight and injure a victim and were then convicted and ordered to 
pay joint restitution.249 Although the trial court could not 
determine which specific injuries were caused by Miller, the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the restitution order, holding 
that the victim’s right to restitution outweighed the offender’s right 
not to pay for an injury that may have been caused by another 
offender.250 Applied here, Miller weighs against Riggs’s odds of 
persuading the court to recognize the victim’s role as a 
contributing cause. 
 242.  Id. 
 243.  See State v. Spann, No. A05-2372, 2007 WL 968421, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Apr. 3, 2007). 
 244.  Id. 
 245.  Id. 
 246.  See id. at *3–4. 
247.  State v. Miller, 842 N.W.2d 474 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014). 
 248.  Id. at 478.  
 249.  Id. 
 250.  See id. 
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2. Application of Causation Analysis to Riggs’s Alternative
Argument
Riggs’s alternative argument boiled down to his assertion that 
the victim’s loss was not entirely the result of his criminal conduct.251 
Although Riggs made a colorable argument that traditional civil-
law-style causation analysis, and therefore comparative fault, was 
encompassed by the statutory term “as a result of the offense,” the 
court wisely declined to read comparative fault into the statute.252 
To succeed, Riggs would have needed to convince the court not 
only to apply Palubicki’s proximate cause but also to take the 
unprecedented step of recognizing the victim’s comparative fault 
within its causation analysis. 
While it is not apparent why the majority declined to apply the 
proximate cause test recognized by Palubicki and other case law, it is 
unlikely to have made a difference in Riggs’s favor. Indeed, rather 
than test the proximate causal link between the victim’s losses and 
Riggs’s crime, the majority appeared to revert back to using the 
but-for test where any loss arising from the sequence of events 
involving the defendant’s crime is subject to restitution.253 
Nonetheless, it seems likely that under either causation test, Riggs’s 
stabbing of D.S. would be considered both a but-for cause and a 
proximate cause of D.S.’s injuries. Therefore, even if the Riggs 
court had applied the causation test under Palubicki, Riggs’s 
argument still hinged on persuading the court that such 
“traditional” causation tests necessarily include consideration of the 
victim’s comparative fault. 
The traditional causation analysis applicable to Minnesota’s 
civil liability law does incorporate comparative fault; however, it 
does not follow that criminal restitution is a proper forum for 
comparative fault simply because restitution also uses a proximate 
cause test. First, unlike criminal restitution, comparative fault is 
expressly identified in Minnesota’s civil liability statute and 
 251.  See State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 687 (Minn. 2015) (Gildea, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 252.  See, e.g., State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 383 (Minn. 2011) (holding 
that the meaning of a particular term in a statute may encompass additional 
meanings and terms, even where the statute is otherwise exclusive). 
 253.  See Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 685–86 (majority opinion) (interpreting the 
phrase “as a result of the offense” to signify consequences that follow naturally 
from a particular action). 
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therefore endorsed by the legislature.254 Second, as the majority 
recognized, the fatal flaw in the Chief Justice’s reasoning in her 
dissent255 is that in Minnesota’s civil law, comparative fault applies 
only to actions for negligent conduct, whereas comparative fault is 
inapplicable to intentionally tortious conduct.256 
Intentional torts of the kind in which Riggs engaged, like 
assault or battery, are not subject to Minnesota’s comparative fault 
statute,257 and contrary to Riggs’s requested remedy,258 civil 
defendants in those intentional tort cases cannot reduce their 
damages by seeking to apportion a share of the fault to the victim. 
Because Riggs committed an intentional act, it is incorrect to argue 
that because the restitution statute permits “traditional causation 
analysis” (i.e., proximate cause), it must also permit comparative 
fault. Even if the court used a civil law approach to assess proximate 
cause at Riggs’s restitution hearing, the victim’s comparative fault 
should have no bearing on the court’s holding because the 
conduct at issue was intentional and not negligent. In a 
hypothetical civil assault case, the only option available to Riggs 
would have been to raise an affirmative defense.259 
 254.  See MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (2016). 
 255.  See Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 686–87 (Gildea, C.J., dissenting) (urging the 
majority to apply a “traditional causation analysis,” which, under Minnesota’s civil 
law, includes the victim’s comparative fault). 
 256.  Id. at 686 n.8 (majority opinion) (citing Lambrecht v. Schreyer, 129 
Minn. 271, 274, 152 N.W. 645, 646 (1915)) (“Contributory negligence is a defense 
only in cases where the action is founded on the negligence of the defendant. It is 
not a defense to an action for assault.”); see also MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (“‘Fault’ 
includes acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless toward the 
person or property of the actor or others, or that subject a person to strict tort 
liability.”). 
 257.  Kelzer v. Wachholz, 381 N.W.2d 852, 854 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (citing 
MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1984)) (“Intentional tort actions are not subject to the 
comparative fault statute.”). 
 258.  See Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 685–86; Appellant’s Brief and Addendum, supra 
note 98, at *12. 
 259.  Whether or not Riggs could have raised an affirmative defense at his 
restitution hearing presents another question. The only appellate case addressing 
the availability of an affirmative defense in a restitution hearing is an unpublished 
case, State v. Graham. No. C1-02-887, 2003 WL 282470 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 
2003). The defendant in Graham pleaded guilty to shooting and killing a dog and, 
at the restitution hearing, tried to raise a statutory justification for the killing. Id. at 
*1. The court held that the defendant lost the opportunity to assert an affirmative 
defense at the restitution hearing by pleading guilty to the underlying crime. Id. at 
*3–4. The Graham court reasoned that it would be an absurd result for an offender
35
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Apportionment of fault, or comparative fault, is a civil law 
concept that is strictly tied to negligence.260 Because comparative 
fault does not exist for intentional torts, by arguing that section 
611A.045 encompassed comparative fault, Riggs essentially asked 
the court to recognize a new legal creation. The court rightly 
declined. To Riggs’s point, while section 611A.045 does permit trial 
courts to assess causation under the proximate cause standard and 
consider multiple causes, the court should not read in non-existent 
features of civil liability, unless expressly authorized by the 
legislature. 
E. The Policy Issues Raised by Riggs Are Properly Deferred to the 
Legislature 
The Minnesota Supreme Court correctly decided the Riggs 
case under Minnesota’s restitution law as it exists today; however, 
there may be good reason for the legislature to incorporate 
comparative fault into the restitution statutes in the future. In fact, 
Riggs raises potential public policy considerations that support 
incorporating comparative fault into restitutionfor instance, 
basic fairness.261 The few Minnesota trial courts that have reduced 
restitution awards under circumstances similar to Riggs seem to be 
to admit guilt in one phase of the criminal proceeding and, in a later phrase, 
argue the opposite to challenge the restitution order. See id. at *3. 
Based on the limited amount of non-precedential case law, it would appear 
that offenders cannot raise affirmative defenses in restitution hearings. The issue 
would be one of first impression; but Riggs did not argue it, and the court was 
under no obligation to consider it. In Riggs’s case, he waived his right to claim self-
defense in the criminal phase when he accepted the plea deal. See State v. Riggs, 
845 N.W.2d 236, 237 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014), aff’d, 865 N.W.2d 679 (Minn. 2015). 
Then, at his restitution hearing, Riggs called the trial court’s attention to the fact 
that he was not raising an affirmative defense to challenge the restitution order, 
seemingly to avoid any comparison with Graham. See Defendant’s Restitution 
Memorandum, supra note 86, at 4. In the restitution order, the trial court stated 
that it did not consider self-defense or any affirmative defense from Riggs in its 
decision to reduce the restitution award by apportioning some of the fault to the 
victim. See State v. Riggs, No. 85-CR-12-960, 2013 WL 9348661, at *2 (Minn. Dist. 
Ct. June 7, 2013), rev’d, 845 N.W.2d 236 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014), aff’d, 865 N.W.2d 
679 (Minn. 2015). 
 260.  See MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subdiv. 1 (2016). 
 261.  See, e.g., State v. Spann, No. A05-2372, 2007 WL 968421, at *1 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Apr. 3, 2007) (“As far as restitution is concerned . . . I’m not going to order 
that you pay the full purchase price on the car, Mr. Spann. I just don’t think it’s 
fair.”). 
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motivated by the perceived injustice of ordering full restitution to a 
victim whose actions unreasonably provoked the chain of events 
leading to his injury. Compensating such victims does not serve the 
purpose of restitution, nor does it create the right incentives. 
Restitution should discourage, rather than encourage, the type 
of dangerous conduct in which the Riggs victim engaged. By way of 
example, in an Arizona case, the supervisor of a care center and 
her employee were transporting three disabled patients in a work 
van.262 During the trip, the supervisor provided the driver, her 
employee, with multiple alcoholic beverages.263 On the return trip, 
the driver lost control of the vehicle and rolled it, severely injuring 
the supervisor and others.264 The trial court refused to order 
restitution to the supervisor because she was partially at fault for 
her own injuries.265 However, the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed 
the order because, like the Minnesota statute, Arizona’s criminal 
restitution law did not permit consideration of victim fault.266 If 
Arizona’s restitution law had allowed for consideration of the 
victim’s fault, the unfair result of a criminally dangerous victim 
receiving significant mandatory restitution could have been 
avoided. 
Some state legislatures have addressed victim fault within the 
context of their restitution statutes. Some states permit a victim’s 
comparative fault to be considered during the restitution 
hearing;267 other states do not.268 The states that have recognized 
comparative fault have generally used explicit or inclusive statutory 
262.  State v. Clinton, 890 P.2d 74, 74–75 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). 
 263.  Id. 
 264.  Id. at 75. 
 265.  Id. 
 266.  See id.  
 267.  See People v. Millard, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 751, 757–59 (Ct. App. 2009); City 
of Whitefish v. Jentile, 285 P.3d 515, 519 (Mont. 2012) (concluding that the 
defendant could raise the defense of comparative negligence at the restitution 
hearing); State v. Laycock, 214 P.3d 104, 113 (Utah 2009) (holding that issues of 
comparative negligence may be relevant in determining restitution). 
 268.  See People v. Johnson, 780 P.2d 504, 507 (Colo. 1989) (holding that the 
restitution statute does not require the sentencing court to determine a 
defendant’s criminal liability for restitution in accordance with comparative 
negligence and rules applicable to a civil case); State v. Wagner, 484 N.W.2d 212, 
216 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992) (holding that comparative fault principles do not apply 
to restitution for criminal acts under Iowa Code chapter 910); State v. Knoll, 614 
N.W.2d 20, 25 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the defendant may not “raise 
contributory negligence as a defense to restitution”). 
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language that clearly authorizes consideration of non-enumerated 
factors during restitution hearings.269 For example, at least one state 
statute enumerates “the contributory misconduct of the victim” as a 
factor that courts must consider for restitution.270 Unlike states that 
authorize comparative fault for restitution, Minnesota’s restitution 
statute lacks similarly explicit or inclusive language.271 
At the federal level, the crime victim restitution statutes also 
contain express, inclusive language permitting courts to consider 
“such other factors as the court deems appropriate.”272 Minnesota’s 
legislature should consider adopting a similarly flexible approach. 
Up to this point, Minnesota’s legislature has elected not to 
incorporate comparative fault in its restitution statutes, but it has 
done so for the Crime Victims Reparations Program. Criminal 
reparations and criminal restitution serve analogous policy 
objectives. If Minnesota’s legislature was guided by similar public 
policy considerations,273 it is not apparent why the legislature 
decided to include comparative fault in criminal reparations and 
not in criminal restitution. Perhaps, as some commentators have 
cautioned, the legislature was concerned that integrating 
comparative fault with criminal restitution would risk turning 
restitution hearings into lengthy civil-liability-like mini-trials.274 
 269.  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.4(d) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 893 of 2016 
Reg. Sess. and Ch. 8 of 2015-2016 2d Ex. Sess.) (“[T]he court shall consider any 
relevant factors, including, but not limited to . . . .”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-243 
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (“‘Pecuniary loss’ means: (a) all special 
damages, but not general damages, substantiated by evidence in the record, that a 
person could recover against the offender in a civil action arising out of the facts 
or events constituting the offender’s criminal activities . . . .”); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 77-38a-102(6) (West, Westlaw through 2016 3d Spec. Sess.) (“‘Pecuniary
damages’ means all demonstrable economic injury, whether or not yet incurred, 
including those which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of the 
facts or events constituting the defendant’s criminal activities . . . .”). 
 270.  See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1325, subdiv. 1 (West, Westlaw through 
2015 2d Reg. Sess.). 
 271.  See MINN. STAT. § 611A.045 (2016). 
 272.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(B)(i)(II) (2012). 
 273.  See MINN. STAT. § 611A.54, subdiv. 2. 
 274.  See Respondent’s Brief, supra note 99, at *11; Shephard, supra note 66, at 
820–21 (“In order to account for victim fault in calculating the restitution award, 
the court would have to create a new post-guilt proceeding. Once the guilt phase 
of the trial has been concluded, the court would next have to initiate a hearing or 
proceeding to evaluate fault and determine restitution. This means that the victim 
would have to return to court to hear and testify about evidence concerning the 
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However, given the similarities between reparations and 
restitution, and based on the seemingly unfair but legally correct 
outcome of the Riggs decision, the legislature should revisit the 
policy choices at work in Minnesota’s criminal restitution scheme. 
In order to discourage dangerous or provocative conduct on the 
part of potential victims and to ensure fairness for defendants in 
situations where a victim provokes a conflict, the legislature should 
consider two options to update restitution. 
For one, the Minnesota legislature could incorporate express 
language allowing comparative fault to be considered in restitution 
determinations by borrowing the express language from 
Minnesota’s reparations statute. The crime victim reparations 
statute provides, “reparations shall be denied or reduced to the 
extent, if any, that the board deems reasonable because of the 
contributory misconduct of the [victim].”275 The legislature could 
incorporate this language from the reparations statute into the 
restitution statute, section 611A.045, and grant discretion to the 
trial judge to determine the victim’s responsibility and adjust the 
restitution award accordingly. Under this option, comparative 
fault—or contributory misconduct, as it is called in section 
611A.54—would also be a factor that trial courts would have broad 
discretion to apply. Statutory recognition of the trial judge’s broad 
discretion over comparative fault would alleviate some of the risk of 
restitution hearings becoming civil mini-trials. 
Alternatively, if the legislature decided that incorporating 
comparative fault into restitution undermined the traditional 
relationships in civil law between intentional conduct, negligence, 
and comparative fault, a second option would be to allow a 
defendant to avail herself of affirmative defenses.276 Affirmative 
defenses should include self-defense and assumption of the risk, 
even if the defendant pleads guilty or is convicted. These defenses 
would help to discourage potential victims from provoking fights or 
offender’s fault and the victim’s own fault, essentially creating a mini-trial. The 
mini-trial would focus on the victim’s conduct and alleged fault, which unlike the 
defendant’s conduct, has not been presented to a jury and has not been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, the mini-trial would juxtapose the victim’s 
alleged fault, which has not been proven, with the defendant’s fault that has been 
proven.”). 
 275.  MINN. STAT. § 611A.54, subdiv. 2. 
 276.  See supra note 255 and accompanying text. 
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engaging in dangerous conduct, such as providing alcohol to their 
drivers. 
In the end, these decisions are best left to the legislature. The 
judiciary has recognized time and again that policy questions are 
for the legislature to decide.277 With respect to the restitution 
statute, the Minnesota Supreme Court has had the occasion to 
address difficult policy choices and has declined to create 
exceptions to the statute.278 Courts must apply the law that the 
legislature writes.279 By declining to read comparative fault into 
section 611A.045,280 the Riggs court rightly deferred to the 
legislature and achieved its objective to apply the statute as it is 
written.281 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Riggs holding requires that restitution orders be based 
only on the factors enumerated in section 611A.045, Minnesota’s 
restitution statute. The holding of Riggs establishes that a victim’s 
fault may not be considered in determining restitution.282 Through 
statutory interpretation, the Riggs court correctly concluded that 
the legislature intended section 611A.045 to be an exclusive list of 
factors for determining restitution. Furthermore, the court 
properly deferred to the legislature in declining to read 
comparative fault into the language of the statute. The policy 
reasons for or against incorporating comparative fault into criminal 
restitution are best resolved by the legislature. To discourage the 
type of dangerous conduct the Riggs victim engaged in and to 
prevent the unfairness that comes from forcing trial courts to 
reward such behavior, the Minnesota Legislature should consider 
 277.  See, e.g., Laase v. 2007 Chevrolet Tahoe, 776 N.W.2d 431, 440 (Minn. 
2009); Haskin v. Ne. Airways, Inc., 266 Minn. 210, 216, 123 N.W.2d 81, 86 (1963) 
(“The strong considerations of public policy which would justify a change in the 
law in this regard are for the legislature and not this court to evaluate.”). 
 278.  See State v. Maidi, 537 N.W.2d 280, 285 (Minn. 1995) (declining to create 
an exception to the restitution statute despite concern that providing restitution 
for costs that potentially violated the laws of a sovereign nation presents grave 
public policy concerns). 
 279.  MINN. STAT. § 645.16; Citizens State Bank Norwood Young Am. v. Brown, 
849 N.W.2d 55, 60 (Minn. 2014). 
 280.  See State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 685–86 (Minn. 2015). 
 281.  See id.; see generally MINN. STAT. § 645.16. 
 282.  Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 686. 
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importing the comparative fault language from Minnesota’s 
criminal reparations statute into its criminal restitution statute. 
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